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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
EXCELSIOR IRON MINING COMPANY, a cor-
poration, and UTAH CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
vs. 
CLARENCE I. JUSTHEIM and ROBERT 
GORLINSKI, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
>Case No. 7825 
CLARENCE I. JUSTHEIM, 
Cross-Plaintiff and Appellant, 
V S . ! 
EXCELSIOR IRON MINING COMPANY, a cor-
poration, and UTAH CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Cross-Defendants and Appellees. 
APPELLANTS ' PETITION FOR RE-HEARING 
The above named Appellants respectfully petition 
this Honorable Court for a re-hearing of the appeal in 
the above entitled action and in support of this petition 
represent to the Court that the opinion rendered by it in 
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this cause and filed with the Clerk of said Court on 
February 2, 1953, fails to consider and pass upon the 
principal critical and vital issue involved in this action 
and in addition assumes the existence of certain facts 
which are not proved by the record but are entirely 
disproved by it. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The opinion concludes with this paragraph: 
"It thus appears to us that when the original 
location was made on the Armstrong placer claim 
and patent was issued therefor, all lodes described 
in the patent and paid for became the property 
of the patentee, and the southern 135 feet of the 
placer claim remained open to the public for lode 
claim filings; and when the Cora lode claimant 
filed on this ground, he was entitled to all of the 
lode which apexed within the fifty feet of surface 
rights awarded to him by his patent, and he had a 
right to follow the ore beyond the sidelines to 
the limits of the ore body. Thus was segregated 
from the public domain all of the iron ore body 
contained within the forty-acre placer claim; and 
when the plaintiff through purchase bought both 
the Armstrong placer and the North 135 feet of the 
Cora lode, it secured title to all of the iron ore 
within the forty-acre tract, and there was nothing 
for Justheim and Gorlinsky to file upon." 
It is therefore a fair statement that the opinion is 
fundamentally based upon the assumption that the 
patent to Thomas R. Jones conveyed to him the mineral 
deposit within the "conflict area." The opinion also 
assumes that the mineral deposit APEXED within the 
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fifty foot strip (Tract A) awarded to Jones by the patent 
and that the "dip" is in a westerly direction. 
It is the contention of Appellants that these three 
a'ssumptions, wholly unjustified by the record, have lead 
the Court to an erroneous conclusion and entitles the 
Appellants to a re-consideration by the Court of its 
decision and opinion. In these particulars the Appel-
lants' contentions will be hereinafter emphasized. 
L 
THE PATENT TO THOMAS E. JONES SPECI-
FICALLY EXCLUDED THE PART OF CORA NO. 
1 LODE CONTAINED WITHIN THE CONFLICT 
AREA, EXCEPT TRACT A. 
The Appellants in their opening Brief, pages 33 to 
36, and in their Reply Brief, pages 1 to 14, have set forth 
their reasons for the above contention. The opinion of 
the Court entirely ignores this contention, although it 
clearly implies that if the Jones patent did not convey 
to him that part of the mineral deposit within the "con-
flict area" (except Tract A) that the Appellees obtained 
no title to same and that such area remained part of the 
public domain open to location by Appellant Justheim. 
It is believed by Appellants, with all due respect to the 
Court, that the contention of Appellants set forth above 
is worthy of serious consideration and decision. It is 
vital for a correct determination of the issues in this case 
for the Court to construe and pass upon the grant of the 
Jones patent. 
3 
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The Court evidently adopted the decision of the 
Colorado Supreme Court in Mt. Rosa Mining, Milling and 
Land Company v. Palmer, 26 Colo. 56, 56 Pac. 176, as 
the basis of its judgment without considering the dif-
ference in the facts between it and the instant case. Ap-
pellants in their briefs cited and relied upon that part of 
the Mt. Rosa case which authorized Justheim to enter 
upon the "conflict area" and make the Lucky locations. 
It exculpates him from the charge of being a trespasser. 
At page 16 of Appellants' Keply Brief, Appellant's were 
very careful to indicate their use of this decision. 
Appellants refer to pages 11, 12 and 13 of their 
Reply Brief and respectfully ask the Court to read the 
same again because therein set forth is the distinction 
between the facts of the Mt. Rosa case and the instant 
case. Appellants repeat the following statement in their 
Reply Brief, page 12: 
"There did not intervene in that case (Mt. 
Rosa) a patent to the lode claims which defined 
the rights of the lode claimants. In the instant 
case there is the Jones patent which definitely 
•sets forth the extent of the grant to Jones. The 
terms of the Jones patent cuts across the factual 
field and distinguishes the instant case from the 
Mt. Rosa case, and makes the rule of that decision 
inapplicable to the instant case." 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
If Appellants' construction of the Jones patent is 
correct, viz., that it specifically excluded that part of 
the mineral deposit upon which the Lucky Claims are 
located then the Mt. Rosa decision can have no bearing 
on the case. On the other hand, if the Jones patent does 
not exclude the part of the deposit in the "conflict area" 
upon which the Lucky Claims are located then the rule 
of the Mt. Rosa case is applicable. In view of this situa-
tion Appellants respectfully insist that they are entitled 
to a definitive interpretation and construction of the 
Jones patent and assert that the absence of such interpre-
tation produces a decision without legal substance or 
•support and based solely on an assumption that the Jones 
patent conveyed to him all the mineral deposit within the 
"conflict area." 
If the Court will give due and proper consideration 
to the Jones patent Appellants believe it will reach the 
conclusion that the patent specifically excluded that part 
of the mineral deposit within the "conflict area" upon 
which the Lucky Claims are located. Appellants have 
discussed this facet of the case at length in their Keply 
Brief and will not burden the Court with a repetition of 
the same. 
n. 
THERE IS NO APEX OF THE MINERAL DE-
POSIT WITHIN TRACT A AND NO EXTRALAT-
ERAL RIGHTS ATTACHED TO TRACT A. 
5 
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Attention is invited to the testimony of the Appel-
lees' witness Dr. A. Lee Christensen set forth at pages 
49 to 61 of Appellants' opening Brief and also the testi-
mony of Earl F. Hansen, Appellee's' witness, set forth 
at pages 39 to 49 of Appellants' opening Brief. The testi-
mony of these experts deny that this mineral deposit con-
tains any apex. To quote Mr. Christensen: 
"* *
 #
 I don't think that ore body has a well 
defined strike or dip. I don't think it is a plane 
surface." (Page 56 Appellants' opening Brief.) 
The colloquy between counsel and Mr. Hansen set 
forth at page 43 of Appellants' opening Brief is interest-
ing and material: 
"Q. What would be your description of this 
deposit ? 
A. I confirm Dr. Christensen's general de-
scription. 
Q. Well, then, I take it that the word 'apex' 
in this kind of thing has no proper application? 
A. That is my understanding of an ore body 
which does not conform to planes. 
Q. In other words, you could not get 'apex* 
out of this case•? That is your theory? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Your opinion? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I am using that, of course, in our general 
understanding of practical mining law, but of 
course this deposit would have strikes along the 
long axis, wouldn't it? 
A. It has a long demension. When we define 
strike, it has reference to a plane and a dip to a 
plane. 
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Q. You say that condition does not exist! 
A. No sir, both sides of that are warped 
surfaces. They are not a plane, and they are in-
clined to be irregular." 
Not only is that part of the Trial Court's finding 19 
which declares that the discovery within "Tract A" lies 
upon the apex of the lode or vein erroneous but also 
Conclusions of Law 1 and 2 of the Trial Court erroneously 
applied the law of extralateral rights to the deposit. 
The Appellate Court fell into these errors in its state-
ment quoted above to-wit: 
<<* * * j j e [ j o n e s ] w a s entitled to all of the 
lode which apexed within the fifty feet of surface 
rights awarded to him by his patent and he had a 
right to follow the ore beyond the sidelines to the 
limits of the ore body." 
Appellants in their opening Brief attack this finding 
and these conclu'sions of law and in their Eeply Brief 
reiterate their criticism of the same. (See pages 2 and 
3 Appellants' Reply Brief.) 
The Appellees, themselves, proved that the mineral 
deposit involved in this action had no apex, no dip and 
no strike. The Law of Extralateral Rights, based on 
R.S. 2322 (U.S.C.A. Title 30, Sec. 26), authorizes the 
locator or patentee of a claim to follow a vein or lode 
throughout its entire depth where the top or apex lies 
inside of the surface lines of the claim, although such 
vein or lode may 'so far depart from a perpendicular in 
its course downward as to extend outside of the vertical 
side lines of the surface location. This extralateral right 
I 
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must be exercised on the "dip" of the vein or lode. (See 
authorities cited pages 63 to 79, Appellants' opening 
brief). The evidence, without contradiction, shows that 
the deposit within Tract A is not a separate deposit 
but is part of the deposit within the "conflict area," but 
there is not a line of evidence in the entire record which 
even suggests or implies that the direction of the "dip" 
of the deposit is from Tract A in a westerly direction 
toward the West quarter corner of Section32. This is a 
secondary assumption of the Court's opinion, which is 
clearly not sustained or supported by the evidence. 
In the face of this proof, submitted by the Appellees, 
it is difficult to believe that this Honorable Court will 
sweep aside Appellants' contentions and simply settle 
the issue by assumptions which have no basis or founda-
tion in the proof. Appellants respectfully request the 
Court to re-consider this aspect of its opinion because of 
its extreme importance. They have demonstrated above 
that title to the part of the mineral deposit within the 
"conflict area" (excluding Tract A) did not pass to Jones. 
If the Court upon reconsideration agrees with this con-
clusion it is respectfully submitted that neither as a 
matter of law or of fact can it hold that extralateral 
rights, as described by the Court in the quotation above, 
attached to Tract A. 
CONCLUSION 
The vital and critical issue in this case is whether 
Jones by his patent secured title to the part of the mineral 
deposit within the "conflict area" upon which the Lucky 
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Claims are located. If he did not then this area was part 
of the public domain and open to location by Appellant 
Justheim. The apex of the deposit is not on Tract A and 
therefore Tract A carried no extralateral rights. 
WHEREFORE, Appellants pray for an order of 
Court granting them the privilege of re-argument and re-
hearing. 
Respectfully 'submitted, 
FRANKLIN RITER, 
Attorney for Defendants 
and Appellants 
312 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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